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Prelude
This paper aims to ascertain and explicate the role of 'social equity'
in the sustainable management of water for irrigation as a 'common
property resource' by focusing on two farmer-managed irrigation
systems from the western Terai. It begins with a brief analysis on
the theoretical understanding of water for irrigation as a 'common
property resource' and 'social equity' and offers specific in-depth
empirical understanding and explication on the role of 'social
equity' in the sustainable irrigation management.
Understanding Water for Irrigation as a Common Property
Resource
It is contextual to have a brief understanding on the very notion of
'common property resource' before gaining clarity on the under-
standing of 'water as a common property resource' wherein 'social
equity' variable plays an important role for the sustainable
irrigation management and development.
Understanding Common Property Resource (CPR):
The literature on CPR basically focuses on the organizational and
institutional arrangements for the management of a particular
resource, which is traditionally conserved and exploited by a group
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of people for their livelihood. Only the co-owners who have
contributed to conserve, develop and sustain the resource for their
livelihood over time do have the property right on it, and can use it
with full sense of security. And they can also transfer the ownership
of the resource as property to other potential resource appropriators.
Thus, following Place and Shallow (2002), I would argue that
exclusivity, security and transferability are the main characteris-
tics of common property resource management, which are largely
governed by the institutions. Jodha (1974) asserts that common
property resources are the resources accessible to the whole of the
community of a village and to which no individual has exclusive
property right.
According to Bennett (1996), common property means that the
group has a collective responsibility for resources, which tends to
guarantee care and conservation; Some of the common elements
regarded as crucial common property resource include a collective
sense of responsibility for resources, sharing of resources by a
specified group of people with specified rights and controlling of
such resources by an identifiable groups (see Bennett 1996; Fisher
1991; Berkes and Farvar; 1989). They also note that common
property systems are characterized by the presence of arrangements
for allocation of the resource among co-owners. They provide
mechanisms for the equitable use of the resources with a minimum
of internal strife. They are the integral part of the local culture.
Ostrom (1997) and Ghate (2003) hold the opinion that the self-
initiated efforts for the management of common property create a
condition for the resource users to be involved over time in making
and adopting rules within collective choice arenas regarding the
inclusion or exclusion of participants, appropriation strategies,
obligation of the participants, monitoring and sanctioning, and
conflict resolution. A shared understanding of social norms plays a
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crucial role in community-initiated management regimes_
Collective action for resource management through organizational
efforts comes into being as the function of resource scarcity. The
co-owners of a resource have, in fact, crated the indigenous
institutions for the governance of the behavior of the resource
appropriators from which a lot of social learnings can be borrowed
to feed in the contemporary mainstream development model.
Understanding Water as a Common Property Resource
Co-operative relationship for the exploitation and utilization of
water for irrigation by sharing is the function of the transient nature
of water. Martin (1986) regards water resource as a "fugitive"
natural resource. "Fugitive" resources are mobile and must be
captured before they can be allocated to individuals or groups.
Since such capture and allocation poses the problem of exclusion,
institutional regulation of these resources tends to develop early.
Referring to the work of Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975),
Martin (1986) argues that common property institutions are the
most important means of regulation of "fugitive" resources." He
considers a farmer irrigation organization as the owner and manager
of water as a common property. He (1986:231) writes:
The rights to the water in the source are vested in the group.
Irrigation organizations work vigorously to exclude non-
members from using the water. The amount of water that
members can use and when they receive it is regulated by
the organization.
Coward (1986) views irrigation development as a property creating
or a property-reproducing process. Collective action is based on
property relations because irrigation groups formulate principles of
action and perform irrigation tasks that reflect prior and continuing
investments in their hydraulic property. He considers this
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relationship of co-property holders as the factor legitimizing and
activating their solidarity.
P. Pradhan (1989) treats water as community property: an
organizing force for farmers in a given system. In a well-organized
system, the beneficiaries perform irrigation-related tasks collec-
tively or the individuals carry out group agreements. He argues that
the concept of "community property" has become the basis for
.organization in all sectors as well. Once the resource becomes the
community property, the group must organize to preserve it and
distribute the benefits to members of the community. This, he
argue, requires a viable community-based organization. Protection
of the water rights is an organizing force (e.g. guarding the source
of water at night in group on rotational basis). Similarly, achieving
water distribution in proportion to water share is also an organizing
force (water shares are distributed among the members on the basis
of investment made during the time of construction and in some
cases, water shares are distributed in proportion to the area
irrigated). Organizations are designed for the acquisition of water,
mobilization of manpower and local resources to operate and
maintain the system, equitable water distribution and minimizing
conflict.
Coward presents the conceptualization of the sociology of irrigation
in the regime of common property. He argues that a sociological
perspective of irrigation can commence with two fundamental
concepts, namely, 'institutions' and 'social organization'. He (1985:
30) writes:
"Institution" in irrigation refers to ideal behavior and role
expectations and as a generic concept for the variety of rules
that help pattern social behavior: norms, folkways, mores,
customs, convention, etiquette. and law. ... In addition to
these institutions. there are in any human group patterns of
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social behavior and interaction that are referred to as the
social organization.
Discussing the principles of irrigation organization for managing
water as a common property, Coward (1979) in another context
states that the operation of an irrigation system is a complex
organizational enterprise that involves engineering and construction
activities, the management of soil- water relationship, the allocation
of water rights to groups and individuals, and other activities. While
there are many tasks which must be organized to sustain the
operation of an irrigation system, three are of fundamental
importance: (i) the organization of water allocation; (ii) physical
maintenance activities; and (iii) conflict management.
Norman Uphoff (1986) also holds the notion that four basic sets of
activities-decision-making and planning, resource mobilization and
management, communication and coordination and conflict
resolution-constitute the core of an organization for managing the
water as a common property resource.
Ostrom (1992) has developed the "institutional design principles"
of long- enduring self-organized irrigation systems on the basis of
empirical evidences. For her, a design principle is an element or
condition that helps to account for the success of institutions in
sustaining the physical works and gaining the compliance of
generations of users to rules-in-use. She presents the design
principles that characterize long-enduring, self-organized irrigation
institutions. These comprise: the clearly defined boundaries of the
service area and the individuals or households with rights to use,
proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; collective-
choice arrangements; monitoring; graduated sanctions; conflict
resolution mechanisms; minimal recognition of rights to organize
and nested enterprises She discusses institutions as rules-in- use.
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Thus, there has been the emphasis on the forms of structural social
capitals and their roles in sustaining the irrigation management. In
other words, the irrigation collective actions are governed by the set
ofcultural norms collectively developed and complied with by the
Irrigators for their mutual benefits and in so doing, the role of the
irrigation organization is crucially important for acquiring the water
In the canal from its source, mobilizing the resources for the regular
repaIr and maIntenance of the canal, allocating and distributing the
water equitably among the irrigators, and managing the conflicts.
Understanding Social Equity in the Context of Sustainable
Common Property Resource Management
The term 'social equity' has acquired much currency in the
contemporary literature of development. The scholars working in
people-centered sustainable development have scrupulously
undersco~ed the notion of "social equity". The existing social
sCIence lIterature on developmental practices describes "social
equity" as "social justice in benefit sharing" or the "fair distribution
of benefits". In this regard, Korten (1990: 4) succinctly writes:
Justice does not require equality of income, nor does it
require that the productive be required to support the
slothful. It does require, however, Ihat all people have the
means and the opportunities [0 produce a minimum decem
livelihood for themselves and their families.
Other development scholars working in the regime of common
property resource management (Gilmour and Fisher 1992'
Mukherjee 200 I and Carol et.al 2002) have also emphasized on th:
say or the active participation of the members of various interest
groups. Pointing out the importance of a fairly broad-base ambience
for decision-making to represent the interests of all groups utilizing
a partIcular common property resource, Gilmour and Fisher (1992)
underscore to ensure the meeting of the legitimate interests and
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needs of disadvantaged groups and empowering them to enhance
their effective role in decision-making. While dealing with the
ingredients of the social equity, Carol et.al (200 I) have underscored
the sufficiency of access to resources; economic opportunity,
decision-making opportunity and justice. Mukherjee (2001) is very
much concerned with the equitable distribution of benefits from the
group-based acti vities for the management of common property
resources. For him, the criteria considered for reflecting 'equity' in
measurement of social capital are broad-based understanding of
group activities and worldview, group participation in decision-
making, equity in benefit-flows and livelihood impacts and
reduction in vulnerabilities.
Thus, there has been an increasing emphasis on the notion of 'social
equity' or 'distributive justice' as one of the guiding principles of
contemporary people-centered development paradigm. Policy-
makers have been asked by the development professionals and
researchers as well as the communities themselves to make the
optimal efforts for ensuring sustainable access to common property
resources. Carol et.al (2001) underscore that such an access implies
three qualities: that the resource remains in sufficient quantity and
quality; that the people can use it as needed or to the same extent as
in the past, and that 'fairness' or 'equity' exists in regulations
governing its use and distribution. Gautam and Uprety (2002) have
argued that the development of water resource as a common
property has to be geared towards promoting equity by simulta-
neously underscoring the institutional inclusiveness through the
representation of the potential beneficiaries in the decision-making
and implementation and accountability of the different stakeholders
involved in the development process.
On the basis of theories of social psychology Lind (1995)
treats fairness or social equity or justice as a device for
resolving conflict. Discussing the fairness norm, he states
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that people are generally willing to accept compromise, as
long as outcomes are fairly distributed and as long as the
clash of people, groups and ideas is governed by rules that
are just and evenhanded. He also notes that people are
willing much of the time to subordinate their own desires to
the greater good, as long as they have faith in some
fundamental fairness in the way that greater good is
achieved.
Slater and Chasca (2003) have also underscored the need to
understand the place of equity or social justice with the livelihood
systems because by exploring it, the sensitivity of our understand-
ings can be enhanced and links between incentives, actions and
institutions developed. This involves exploring rights-based
approaches to natural resource use and management and the links to
livelihoods. They also argue that our understanding of equity and
justice relates very closely to notions of rules and practices. We
need a more sophisticated understanding of the structure of rights
that can address the questions of justice and that these are desirable
goals. Participation of the broader community in the management
of the resource, fair decentralization of decision-making, and fair
distribution of benefits can regulate the" free-riding".
Pradhan (200 I) is of the opinion that equity of distribution does not
mean equal distribution to all, but distribution according to a system
of rules, which everyone can understand. Sometimes, rules allow
different groups to receive quite different quantities of water, but
users accept the fact because they know the basis for the rules. He
underscores that the rule system must be transparent, easy to
understand, operate, and monitor.
Some other scholars working in the regime of water for irrigation
have also focused on equity in resource mobilization and irrigation
access (see Shukla and Shanr.a 1997; Tang 1989). From the
foregoing discussion it becomes clear that most scholars agree that
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resource management systems which have emphasized panicipation
of the various interest groups in the governance structures and
decision-making processes in the most inclusionary way, and equtty
in the resource mobilization and distribution of the benefits have
remained sustainable.
The Social Settings of the Study Area
Research was conducted in the command areas of Sora and Chatris
Mauja farmer-managed irrigation systems located in the plains of
Rupendehi district. These irrigation systems have a command areas
of about 1,500 and 3,500 hectares of land, respectively. These were
originally constructed by the autochthonous Tharu people of the
Tearai. Initially, the Sora Mauja irrigation system served a total of
16 Maujas (settlement areas which roughly corresponded to
villages) and Chartis Mauja irrigation system served a total 36
Maujas. But the command areas of both the systems later
expanded a function of the population growth triggered by the HIll
to Terai migration particularly after 1960. The migrants comprise
Brahmins, Chhetlris, traditional service caste people and
indigenous nationalities of Mongoloid origin.
Field research in 2003 revealed that, the Sora Mauja was expanded
to 30 Maujas and Chhatlis Mauja was expanded to 56 Maujas. The
increase and decrease of the number of command Maujas depends
on whether the farmers make the regular collective contribution of
labor and financial resources for the repair and maintenance of the
irrigation systems. Though both these systems were originally
developed in two different locations of Tianu River more than 170
years ago, they have been sharing water from a single mega- canal
since 1964. Since then, the mega-canal has been jointly managed up
to the point of bifurcation (called Tara Prasad Bhond) from where
water has been divided between the two systems proportionate to
the size of their respective command areas.
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Despite the heterogeneity in the social structure of the beneficiary
farmers of the command areas, both irrigation systems have been
effectively functioning for a relatively long period and have become
the often-cited references of the participatory and sustainable
irrigation systems in Nepal. Hence, I have selected these two
systems to document the role of social equity among the stake-
holders of irrigation systems with a view to generating the social
leamings, which are worth sharing for the wider academic
discourse on developmentalism (i.e external intervention vs
indigenous model or the blending of the both?) for the sustainability
of the development, including in the regime of water as a common
property resource.
Methodology Employed
The fieldwork for garnering the data to write this paper was
conducted in March and April of 2003. While drawing the sample
locations for the study, first of all, the whole command area of both
irrigation systems was divided into head, middle and tail locations
in consultation with the key informants. And one Mauia was
randomly selected from each location of the Sora Mauia irrigation
system, which is a total of three Mauias (10% of the total 30
Mauias during the period of the study). Similarly, two Mauias were
selected from each location of Challis Mauias, which is a total of
six Mauias (10.7 % of the 56 total Mauias during the period of the
study).
A total of 31 key informants were selected and interviewed to
obtain qualitative information. Of these, four comprised from the
joint management committee (the chairman, vice-chairman,
secretary and Meth Muktiyar - chief staff), II from Sora-Mauia (the
chairman, vice-chairman and secretary of the main committee, two
Meth Muktiyars- chief staffs, three Mauia Muktiyars-village level
staffs, and three regional representatives out of the six) and 16 from
Chhatlis Mauia (the chairman, vice-chairman and secretary of the
main committee, Meth Muktiyar-- chief system level staff, SIX
regional representatives out of nine, and six Mauia Mukriyars--
village chief staffs) from six sample village-level Irrigation
committees. They furnished data on the role of social equity among
the stakeholders of both the systems and their role in the
sustainability of the irrigation management.
The primary data was collected by means of the ethnographic
method, Ethnographic method in this research involved the dIrect
and participant observation and key informant interviews. Utmost
effort was made for the triangulation of the information generated
in the field.
Social Equity Regime in Sora and Chattis Mauia
This section focuses on the governance structures for ensuring the
social equity in a multi-stakeholder situation through the
involvement of various interest groups. In particular it deals wIth
decision-making processes as well as equity in resource mobiliza-
tion and management, distribution of water for irrigation. and
information sharing. Rules for conflict management and for
maintaining the transparency and accountability for ensuring the
equity/fairness are also discussed.
Governance Structures in a Multi-stakeholder Situation
It is contextual to have the understanding on the notion of
'governance' in farmer-managed irrigation system (FMIS) before
explicating the empirical facts. Coward (2004) shares that .FMIS
needs to govern the internal actions through the exercIse. of
authority or control and management such as building and repatrlng
water works, allocating and distributing water and resolvmg
. H also
conflicts and disagreements among water appropnators. e
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underscores the external activities to be organized including dealing
with other irrigation groups and state and its agencies. Governance
is also concerned with organizing group actions to deal with the
vagaries of the environment. In fact, non-state entities such as the
irrigation organizations govern the behavior of the water appropria-
tors in the management and the utilization of water for sustained
irrigation. Thus, FMIS govemance is vitally imponant for the
effective and continuing operation.
Both the irrigation systems under study have the nested enterprises
of the governance organizational structures. They have three-
layered of the governance-nested enterprises, namely, system level
executive commiltees, regional commiltee structures, and Mauja
level committees. Put in Olher words, they have the federated
governance structures. Given the fact that bOlh systems have shared
the water from the single mega- canal, they have also formed a
Sora-Chhatlis joint management committee comprising the
representatives from both the irrigation systems.
Given the fact that the Sora and Chhatlis Mauja staned to share
water from the same diversion since 1964, the water management
effort became joint from the headwork to Tara Prasad Bhond-- the
place from where the water has been bifurcated/divided propor-
tionate to the size of their respective command areas. And all this
was feasible only through the formation of a joint governance
structure comprising the representatives from both the systems.
Both the systems have the constitutional provisions to send
representatives to it so long as the committee has the justification of
being in the operation. As per the understanding of the representa-
tives of the two systems, Chhatlis Mauja nominates six members
and Sora Mauja nominates five members from their respective
system level executive committees making a total of II members.
Of the 11 members, one is elected as the chairman, one vice-
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chairman, one secretary and one treasurer as the functionaries and
other remain as the members. The committee has also Meth
Muktiyar (chief staff) and one Chaukidar (watchman-cum-
messenger).
Both the systems have provisions of appointing Meth Mukthiyars
(chief system level staff-one in Chhatlis and two in Sora) and other
staffs for discharging the irrigation-related activities with the
direction of the executive committees. Both have the provision of
the appointment of organizationally and institutionally speaking,
they are the backbones of both the systems because in actuality,
they are the ones who play the instrumental role in making the
systems operational by mobilizing the Kularas in the Kulahai (labor
contribution for repair and maintenance) and distributing water
between and among the Maujas equitably as per the direction of the
executive committees. They are basically assisted by the
Chaukidars (watchmen) in discharging their duties.
In the case of both irrigation systems, there is also the provision of
Mauja Muktiyars (village level staffs) who are selected by the water
appropriators of the particular Mauja (village) and are responsible
for disseminating the information of the village level committee
apropos of its activities, distributing water equitably, mobilizing the
labor, resolving the conflicts, getting the decisions of the executive
committees implemented, etc. Though not universal, there is also
the Gaun Chaukidar (village level watchman) in the irrigation
systems who comply with the orders of the Gaun Muktiyars,
Chetradakshya (regional chairman/representative) and executive
committee. He plays the crucial role in the exchange and dissemi-
nation of the information.
Both Sora and Chhattis Mauja irrigation systems have their
democratic culture in the regime of decision-making. At the Mauja
level, all the water appropriators have the opportunity to have their
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say during the time of Mauja level general assemblies or any other
mass meetings. Their genuine voices, regardless of the caste/ethnic
and class statuses, are heard by the concerned functionaries and
staff and decisions made accordingly. If any genuine problem
related to the irrigation, resource mobiiization and any other related
works crops up during the discussion of the general assemblies,
decisions are made immediately in a participatory way. If it can be
resolved at the Mauja level, the functionaries of the Mauja level
committee and the Mauja Muktiyar make efforts for this. But if it
cannot be resolved at this organizational level, this is communica-
ted to the higher-level committees and staff of the organizations. In
both the irrigation systems, the regional level committee structure
composed of the representatives of each command Mauja simply
works as the link between the system level executive committees
and Mauja level committees.
The Amsabha (the general meeting) and the Sadharansabha
(general assembly) are also the powerful bodies for making the
decisions where the representatives of the farmers from all the
Maujas participate. In these fora, every representative has the
opportunity to articulate clearly the inter-systemic, systemic, inter-
Mauja and intra-Mauja (which cannot be solved locally) irrigation-
related problems and actively contribute to the process of decision-
making and planning. During the process of decision-making,
majority view is granted. It is the same case in the Sora-Chhattis
Mauja joint committee.
In both the irrigation systems, the planning approach is highly
decentralized. More specifically, the planning for the jointly-
operated canal up to Tara Prasad Bhond is the domain of the Sora-
Chhaltis joint management committee. The system level planning is
the domain of the autonomous executive committees. And finally,
the Mauja level planning is the domain of the Mauja level
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committee. The planning activities have to happen within the
boundary of the constitutional arrangement and the annual policy
level decisions made by the general meetings/general assemblies.
In the governance-nested enterprises of both the systems, the
resolutions are passed either through consensus or voting system.
Each organizational nested enterprise formulates its plan every year
for the water acquisition, system maintenance, water distribution,
and resource mobilization with emphasis on social equity.
Equity in Resource Mobilization and Management
The water appropriators of both the systems have developed an
organizational culture for mobilizing and managing the resources/
inputs required for the repair and maintenance and operation of the
irrigation systems in the most equitable fashion. In fact, the
operational rule implemented by the elected functionaries and
employed staffs with the mandate of the water appropriators has
been immensely instrumental in sustaining the irrigation systems. In
fact, it is this aspect of culture that has the bearing on the
popularization of these two relatively old irrigation systems. This
relative strength has enticed a large number of the lead farmers and
trainees from other parts of Nepal to visit them for learning about
the resource mobilization and management culture.
In both the systems, the principal financial sources include: (i)
Khara Sulka (fines) collected in the case of the non-contribution of
the labor by the water appropriators; (ii) fines collected from the
persons/Maujas who have violated the rotational rule of the water
distribution or stolen water in others' turn; (iii) fee collected while
changing the Mohada (diversion location) of the branch canals from
the system main canal; (iv) entry fee for any new Mauja and re-
entry fee for old Mauja (who relinquished to use water after using
for some time) charged on the basis of the number of Khetala
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(laborer) to be made available for the annual repair and
maintenance of main system canals; (v) money collected from the
water appropriators during the time of emergency (in the form of
the assistance); (vi) any amount of money received from
government, non-governmental organizations and persons in form
of grant, etc, and (vii) Bigathhi (the annual irrigation service fee
rate to be paid to the organization if one is unwilling or not
available to contribute the labor for the system repair and
maintenance and the rate varies from one Mauja to the other).
The basis of labor mobilization for the repair and maintenance of
the headwork and jointly-operated section of the mega- canal
system is Kulara in both the systems. One Kulara means one
laborer per 25 Bighas of land. Both the systems have a typology of
Sheer Kulahai (labor work for the repair and maintenance of the
headwork of the canal). These are called Sabik (one laborer per 25
Bighas of land per day), Double (two laborers per 25 Bighas of land
per day), Treble (three laborers per 25 Bighas per day) and Chauble
(jour laborers per 25 Bighas of land per day). Generally, Sabik
system of labor mobilization is practiced if the repair and
maintenance work is not voluminous. The increase of the number of
the laborers is the function of the volume of the siltation and the
debris along the alignment of the head of the main canal. When
there is tremendous amount of work for desilting the headwork,
there may be the exhortation from the executive committees of both
the systems for sending one laborer from each household
compulsorily, which is called Jharuwa in the local parlance. Thus,
labor for the Sheer Kulahai is generally mobilized in the equitable
way. The Meth Muktiyar of the Sora- Chhattis joint management
committee mobilizes the laborers for Sheer Kulahai with the regular
co-operation of the Meth Muktiyars of Sora and Chhattis Mauja
systems who are remunerated for their services.
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The Meth Mukthiyars of both the irrigation systems also play the
instrumental role in mobilizing the labor from each Mauja for the
repair and maintenance of the separate Sora and Chhattis canal
systems. Both the systems have a traditional norm of asslgmng the
Maujani Naj (in the parlance of Sora- Mauja) or Maujani Nath (m
the parlance of Chhattis Mauja) which is the measured area of the
main canal assigned to a particular Mauja for its annual repair and
maintenance. It is always the responsibility of the individual Mauja
to clean the canal portion assigned to it either on the basis of the
labor mobilization of the irrigator household proportionate to the
size of the landholding or on Jharauwa basis in isolated cases.
Labor contribution proportionate to the size of the holdings is more
or less universal in both the systems.
Both the systems have developed a norm to pay Khara for failing to
contribute the labor to repair and maintain the canal systems. The
potential punishment is determined by the responses of the
concerned Mauja. If the punishment is also ignored, the non-
complaint Maujas may face the dismissal. Both the systems also
have developed the norm to repair and maintain the branches,
tertiaries, water courses and field channels with the labor/cash
contribution from the beneficiaries of the command area.
The governance structures of both the systems have been extremely
successful in the mobilization of the internal resources. They are
maintained by the internal resources. Put in other words, the
payment of the remuneration of the staff and operation cost is
largely met by the amount of Kharas collected every year. In
exceptional cases, there is also the exemption. For instance, in
Sora- Mauja, if there is any genuine cause for not paying the
amount required and labor demanded, the Mauja can be exempted.
The Meth Muktiyar needs to consult the chairman of the executive
committee and follow his directive.
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Though land ownership or leasing -in the land within the command
area, membership in the organization, payment of certain entry fee
each time before withdrawing water and regular contribution of
labor or cash or both for the repair and maintenance of the irrigation
system create the bases for the creation of the property rights for a
particular water appropriating household, each household of Sora-
Mauja and Chhattis Mauja has to contribute labor or Bighatti
(irrigation fee per Bigha) every year for the irrigation system
maintenance. Failure to do so results in the deprivation of the water
rights. And all this is indicative of the fact that there is complete
control of the free-riding behavior which has, in turn, generally
contributed to ensuring equity in labor or cash resource contribution
for the operation and maintenance of the irrigation systems.
Though resource contribution is generally proportionate to the size
of the land holding, there are isolated instances of mobilizing the
labor on "lharuwa" basis (compulsory contribution of labor every
day until the repair and maintenance is over). The raisoll d'etre of
the continuity of the practice of the Kulara system is that it is the
most equitable system of labor mobilization for the repair and
maintenance of the headwork and the jointly-operated canal system,
which ensures water rights for the farmers without any form of
exploitation. The system was the function of the abandonment of
the lharuwa, Sidhabandhi (labor contribution with foodstuff for the
night halt until the repair and maintenance is over) and Bhujabandi
(labor contribution with tiffin to work for the full day until the
repair and maintenance is over) systems practiced in the past which
was exploitative in nature (because the small holders had to
contribute same amount of labor like the large holders).
Nonetheless, there is still the remnant of lharuwa system to a lesser
extent among a few Maujas for the Mauja level repair and
maintenance and large-scale ~mergency maintenance of the
headwork of the common mega- canal.
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Equity in Water Allocation and Distribution
Albeit the terms "allocation" and "distribution" are interchangeably
used, they have different connotations in the literature of irrigation.
"Allocation" is the entitlement to the use of water, which is
mutually agreed by the beneficiaries and "distribution" is the actual
delivery of water to their fields as per the agreed principle. A
permanent proportioning divider has been constructed at a place
called Tara Prasad Bhond as per the consensual decision between
the representatives of both the systems. The total volume of the
water running in the single mega-canal has been considered to be
16 allllas (a local unit of measurement for 100%) of which 6.5
annas of water has been allocated to Sora- Mauja and 9.5 annas of
water was allocated to Chhattis Mauja. The permanent structure is
such that automatically divides the flowing water in the two
separate canals as per the agreed principle, which ensures equity in
the actual distribution of water between the two systems.
In both the irrigation systems, the water appropriators have evolved
their own cultural norm of water allocation, that is, Kulara is the
basic water allocation unit. As indicated above, the traditional local
cultural definition of one Kulara is the 25 Bighas of land. Each
Mauja is required to send one laborer for the repair and
maintenance of the main system canals per Kulara as and when
needed. Thus, traditionally, each Mauja has the right to claim the
fraction of the total discharge of water perennially flowing in the
main canals, which has to be proportionate to the number of the
Kularas. Kulara has still been the unit of labor/cash contribution or
resource mobilization. Kulara has been found easier unit for them
to calculate the share of water and resource contribution from the
water appropriating Maujas. This has been primarily so because
one can claim the right to water upon the fulfillment of the
requirement of resource contribution (cash or labor or both).
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The general practice of the water distribution from the outlets of the
main canals depends on the number of Kularas assigned to a
particular Mauja. In both the systems, water flows continuously in
all the branches during the period of the abundance of water in the
rainy season. And particularly for the water scarce period in winter
and spring seasons, the water appropriators have evolved an
operational cultural norm of the rotational distribution of water. The
system level executive committees decide the number of hours for
the rotational distribution of water. For instance, in the case of Sora
Mauja, one Kulara may get 8 hours' water distribution per Kulara.
It was reported that water is distributed for 6-7 hours per Kulara in
Chhattis Maujas by preparing water schedule.
In both the systems, the outlets for the branch canal for water
distribution from the main canals are constructed as per the decision
of the system level executive committees. Though the outlets are
manually constructed based on the observational judgment, they are
reliable to distribute the water as per the allocation principle. The
outlet of Mallja is measured as per the availability of water in the
main canals. The width, length and height of the outlets are
determined on the basis of the number of Klliaras (despite the fact
that they do not have the scientific system of measurement and
control). Sacks of sand are used to control the outlets of water from
the main canals.
Once the water flows within the boundary of the Maujas in both the
systems, the Mallja Mukriyars, with the advice of the Mauja level
committee and the assistance of the Mallja Chaukidars, distribute
the water by preparing the water schedule for the head, middle and
tail locations within the Mallja settings regardless of the abundance
and scarcity of the water. In practice, the Mallja Mllkriyars and
Chaukidars monitor the effective execution of the rotational
distribution of water. As indicated above, during the water scarce
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period, water appropriators within the MUlljas strictly follow
"Chanre Pallo" (hourly tum). At the Mauja level, each household
gets water to its field proportionate to its size. The effective internal
resource mobilization is possible because of the equitable distribu-
tion of water to grow crops.
Equity in Information Sharing
The existence of in-built cultural norm for the communication
within the organizations of the irrigation systems and between the
irrigation organizations of the two systems and other external
agencies and between and among the water appropriators is of
paramount importance. Both irrigation systems have also developed
their own reliable systems of communication. Within the systems,
the decisions made by the executive committees about the resource
mobilization for the systemic regular and emergency maintenance
and water allocation and distribution are communicated to the
Mauja level committees and Mauja Mukriyars by the Merh
Mukriyars with the support of the Chaukidars/office assistants of
the executive committees. Once this is done, the Mauja Mukriyar,
with the support of the Mauja Chaukidar, disseminates the
information among the water appropriators of the Mauja.
Occasionally, the water appropriators also meet the system level
Merh Mukriyars and functionaries/members of the executive
committees. During such meetings, the water appropriators are also
informed informally about the organizational decisions and the
irrigation-related activities. During the period of the general
meetings/general assemblies in both the systems, the representa-
tives of the water appropriators participate in the decision-making
process and during that time also, they communicate the operational
problems of command area Maujas faced by the water
appropriators. This is one way of the communication from top to
bottom.
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But there is also the system of bottom-up communication. For
example, the decisions made by the Mauja level committee are
communicated to the Meth Muktiyars or the functionaries of the
executive committees through the Mauja level chairmen/ Muktiyars
/ Chaukidars. The complaints lodged by the water appropriators at
the Mauja level (if they cannot be solved locally) are also
communicated to the executive committees/ Meth Muktiyars in the
same way. The nine regional representatives of Chhallis Mauja and
six regional representatives of Sora Mauja also work as the link of
communication between the Mauja level committees and executive
committees. If there is any serious operational problem being
confronted at the Mauja level by the water appropriators, they
communicate it to the Mauja level committees /Mauja Muktiyars
who send message to the system level executive committees/Meth
Muktiyars for their support to resolve it.
The decisions made by the executive committees that potentially
affect both Sora and Chhaltis are also communicated to the joint
management committee and its Meth Muktiyar through the
Chaukidars or Meth Muktiyars or other functionaries of the
executive committees who represent the system in the joint
management committee. Depending upon the gravity of the
problem/issue, both formal (through written letters) and informal
(oral) means of communication are used. The Meth Muktiyar/ the
secretary of the joint management committee communicates the
message to the Meth Muktiyars of the Sora-Chhallis Maujas
through its Chaukidar and their system level executive committees
on the regular and emergency maintenance work and the necessary
resource mobilization for the main canal above the Tara Prasad
Bhond. The decisions of the joint committee (as per the necessity)
are also communicated to both the executive committees in formal
way.
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Rules for Conflict Management for Ensuring the Equity/
Fairness
The water appropriators have developed their own indigenous
system of conflict management. In other words, infractions are
resolved through both the informal and formal mechanisms. While
discussing the indigenous institutional systems of resolving the
conflict in the command areas of both the irrigation systems, the
analyses have proceeded at three levels: inter-systemic conflict,
inter-Mauja conflict, and intra-Mauja conflict.
Given the fact Sora and Chhallis Mauja irrigation systems have
been using the irrigation from the same source of water and from
the same mega-canal, sometimes conflicts may occur apropos of the
water allocation and distribution and resource mobilization. Under
such condition, the joint management governance structure/
committee helps to resolve any outstanding issues/problems
between the two systems. Both the systems have been managing the
water as a 'commons' very successfully for sustaining their liveli-
hood by resolving inter-systemic conflict through consensus -a
function of the mutual discussion, negotiation, trust, solidarity, etc.
Conflicts between and among the Maujas are also the common
sociological phenomena in this irrigation system. The conflicts
between the head, middle and tail locations arising from the
violation of the distributional norms do occur frequently. Some of
the conflicts are specific to the cropping seasons. For example,
conflicts between the Maujas occur more frequently during the
period of the paddy nursery seedbed preparation. Such cases are
generally mediated by the system level executive committee. The
conflicting parties generally accept the decisions. More specifically,
a water monitoring committee comprising of four members has
been formed for the settlement of water cases in Sora Mauja
irrigation system. This committee charges fine if a Mauja steals the
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water in the tum of another Mauja. It charges Rs. 500 for the one
time water theft. All inter-Mauja conflicts are settled within the
Maujas. They do not resort to the courts/police/administration for
the conflict settlements.
Intra-Mauja conflict is also very frequently occurring sociological
phenomenon. The principal sources of the conflict comprise the
violation of water distributional turn between head, middle and tail
locations, water theft, unjust distribution of water between head,
middle and tail farmers (which is disproportionate to the size of the
landholding of a particular location), etc. Water theft within the
Mauja is more frequent during the period of paddy nursery bed
preparation and maize cultivation. Characterizing the scale of the
water theft during the period of the maize culti vation in March-
April, one key informant of Sora- Mauja remarked: "Water
appropriators here have a proclivity to steal water very frequently
during the period of maize cultivation but they are ready to pay
Rs.500 as fine because that payment of fine contributes to accrue
Rs. 7000-8000 from the sale of the cobs of maize". When the
conflict arises between and among the farmers of the head, middle
and tail locations or between and among the water appropriators of
a particular location, the issue is brought to the Mauja Muktiyar by
the affected partylies who then make the immediate on the spot
observation for the study of the situation. During the period of the
observation, the conflicting parties are allowed to present their
arguments. The witnesses are also called. Once the complaints of
the conflicting parties and the opinions of the witnesses are heard,
the Muktiyar tries to persuade the conflicting parties and resolve the
issue through compromise. Failing this, the case is brought to the
Mauja level mass meeting, which then finalizes the case through
the elaborate discussion. The personls responsible for the infraction
of the irrigation norm haslhave to accept the decisions of mass
arbitration including the compromise/payment of the compensa-
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tions to the affected party/ies. Generally, the intra-Mauja conflict!
are not referred to the police, court and administration. This shows
that community verdict is the final one.
Both the irrigation systems have crafted a norm to impose the
graduated sanctions on the persons! Maujas responsible for the
infraction of the rules. In the case of Sora Mauja, if any Mauja
within the system develops a Mohodha (diversion of the water-
course) from the main canal at its own disposal by severely
affecting other Maujas and steals water, Rs.500 is collected as the
compensatory fine from this Mauja for the first Kulahai year,
Rs.lOOO for the second time, Rs.2000 for the third time and if the
act of non-compliance/stealing continues, a compensatory fine up to
Rs. 10,000 can be imposed on it. If the water is stolen by a Mauja
during the Maujane Palo (rotational tum of a particular Mauja) of
another by diverting water from the main canal and if it is proved, it
will be fined Rs.500 for the first time, Rs. 1000 for the second time,
and Rs. 2000 for the third time.
Sora Mauja has also the system of imposing the fines for the non-
compliance of the rules for the repair and maintenance of the main
system canal. The rule stipulates that while repairing and maintain-
ing the main system canal, the Maujas have to finish the assigned
Naj/Nath (measurement of the assigned labor work) at the
said/specified time. If the assigned work remains incomplete, they
have to pay the fines as compensations for the all Kularas. If the
Kularas leave the Kulahai after accepting the Naj/Nap, they are
imposed double compensatory fines in the usual Khara fixed. The
compensatory fines imposed on the Kularas for being absent in the
Kulahai is decided by the Sadharansabha every year.
There are also the cultural norms of imposing the graduated
sanctions in the larger command area of Chhattis Mauja. For
example, if any Mauja develops a Mohoda (diversion of the
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watercourse) from the main system canal at its own disposal by
severely affecting other Mauja and steals water, compensatory fines
are imposed by looking at the level of negative impact. For the fist
time, it will be fined Rs.IOOO, Rs.1500 for the second time, and Rs.
3000 for the third time. And if the trend of non-compliance
continues, the maximum punishment can be inflicted upon it by
closing the Mohoda from the main system canal for a specific
season or for the whole year. This nonn is also applicable to the
case of violating Maujani Palo (the rotational tum of a Mauja) by
any Mauja. But the norms of Mauja are applied in the case of
violation of the water rights of water appropriators within the
Mauja as decided by the functionaries and staff of the Mauja
committee. If any Mauja cannot finish the repairing and maintain-
ing the dry main system level in the specified period of time, it has
to pay Rs.250 to the committee as Khara per Kulara prior to
accepting another Najl Nath. Khara has to be paid for the number
of days required for completing the Najl Nath. The daily rate of
Khara for the absence of the Kulahai for other than the dry main
system level canal is decided by the Sadharansabha.
Rules for Maintaining Transparency and Accountability
The cross-cultural studies on the indigenous resource management
systems have demonstrated that they have a high degree of
transparency and accountability which, in tum, have contributed to
ensuring 'social equity'. Transparency in the organizatiqnal and
institutional system ensures trust/confidence between and among
the members-- a strong social capital/asset for harnessing the social
energy of the community of the resource appropriators. The culture
of maintaining the sustainability of both the irrigation systems is the
direct function of the traditionally "nurtured culture of maintaining
the transparency and accountability". The operational rules as well
as the constitutional provisions are, in fact, framed democratically.
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In other words, even though they are drafted by the committees
authorized by the powerful decision- making bodies such as the
general meeting and the general assembly, they are finally
ratified/approved by these bodies after the protracted discussions
and deliberations. And the approved copies of the constitutions,
which also have the operational rules, have been distributed to the
responsible members, functionaries of the different layers of the
committees, and the interested water appropriators. So there is
complete transparency of the irrigation operational rules and
constitutional provisions at the system level. Occasionally, the same
powerful decision-making bodies as per the organizational
necessity amend these and the amendment process is also transpa-
rent because the amendments are discussed elaborately in these
powerful decision-making bodies and approved. These constitu-
tional and operational rules have always underscored the equity
considerations as discussed in the preceding sections.
The Mauja level committees also frame their own operational rules
without contradicting to the system level rules/constitutional
provisions. But in so doing, they also get them approved through
the Mauja level mass meeting of the water users. The functionaries
and members do implement/enforce only those operational rules
that are approved by the mass meeting. So transparency of the
operational rules is maintained even at the Mauja level.
As indicated earlier, the primary source of income for both the
systems is the Khara which is collected by the system level Meth
Muktiyars with the support of MaLlja/Gaon Muktiyars. The annual
irrigation service fee called Bighatti is also collected in each MaLlja
in lieu of the Kutahai. This collected money is handed over to the
treasurer for the proper book-keeping. And given the fact that both
the systems have the culture of having the account audited and
presenting to the general assemblies/general meetings for the
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elaborate discussion and questioning, there is full transparency of
the whole financial system (also see the resource mobilization
section). It is these decision-making bodies, which approve the
audited record of income and expenditure. If any functionary
misappropriates the funds, the public criticism and the pressure of
the executive committee are so strong that there is nO other way
other than returning the misappropriated fund. This transparency
encourages the water appropriators to be organized for the mutually
beneficial collective action.
Given the fact that the command areas of both the irrigation
systems are increasingly being urbanized, there is already high level
of awareness among the water appropriators apropos of the roles of
the irrigation functionaries and the staff of the system level and
Mauja/Gaon level committees. The awareness is triggered by the
literacy/education variable. Succinctly put, all of the functionaries/
leaders including the staffs have to be accountable to the water
appropriators. If they cannot work for the promotion of the
collective interest! equitable distribution of the benefits, there can
be growing complaints by the water appropriators against them.
Once the issue of the injustice or deprivation of the benefits begins
surfacing, fellow water appropriators also take such incidence very
seriously and there is the talk in the community about it. Though
party politics is not played within the organization after the
election, the political groupings can play an important role in
determining and electing the functionaries and the members of the
nested enterprise. Hence, the issues of the unaccountability and
injustice can be capitalized during the time of the election and the
functionaries/members may not be elected/selected again.
Therefore, the degree of accountability is high in both the systems.
It is also the same for the system level and Mauja level staff. For
example, it has also been ascertained that both the system level
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Meth Muktiyars and Mauja/Gaon level Muktiyars are also required
to be transparent and accountable in executing the decisions.
Failure to do so may result in the severe "public criticism".
Dismissal may be the eventual outcome.
Closing Remarks
The traditional farmer-managed irrigation systems have succeeded
in addressing social issues such as equity among the water
appropriators. In other words, there is always an effort for putting
people first in such systems and therefore, they have been
sustainable for relatively long period of time. When there had been
nO focus on the people and other social issues under the
modernization paradigm and over-emphasis On the rational
technology in 1950s and I960s, the development interventions
including in the irrigation sector could not be sustainable. It
followed as a corollary that a group of social scientists, mainly
sociologists and social anthropologists, began emphasizing on
"putting people first" in development projects in 1980s. Michael
Cernea (1985) considers "putting people first" as a firm request to
give priority to what is the basic fact~r in development. In fact, he
considers the vital role of sociology and social anthropology as the
non-economic social sciences, which study peoples, cultures, and
societies. These are slowly being recognized because of the
repeated failures in development programs which were socio-
logically ill-informed and ill- conceived. This reluctant recognition
leads to increased interest in identifying and addressing the socio-
cultural variables of projects. Rules for Maintaining Social Equity
among the Disadvantaged Groups within the Irrigation Systems.
In fact "putting people" under the contemporary people-centered
development paradigm means emphasizing on social issues such as
equity consideration and a lot of lessons can be learned in this
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regard from the traditional farmer-managed irrigation systems such
as the ones described in this paper.
Given the fact that irrigation management is a mutually beneficial
collective action, there is the involvement of multi-stakeholders in
the systems studied. These farmers have a democratic space to
participate in the decision-making process and articulate their
interests. As noted in this paper, smaller holders and autochthonous
Tharus are the disadvantaged groups. Most of these social groups
have direct participation in the meetings/ general assemblies of the
Mauja (village) level committee. In these fora, every member of
these social groupings is encouraged by the local leadership to
articulate their opinions/ voices, share their irrigation- related
problems, assess the performances of the leadership and policies,
and their inconsistencies (if any). In the system'level governance
structures also, the voices of the different interest groups have been
heard because the leaders represent them.
As analyzed in the preceding sections, both the systems have
evolved the norm for the equitable distribution of the water, that is,
every appropriator is entitled to receive the water proportionate to
the size of the landholding, which is again determined, by the
amount of contribution (cash or labor or both) as per the necessity.
This fair distribution of water as per the norm is equally applicable
to all the water appropriators regardless of the socia-economic
statuses. This means the minority Tharu ethnic people as well as the
small holders have also the right to the equitable distribution of
water. There is no evidence of the discrimination in this regard. The
activities of the governance-nested enterprises such as the resource
mobilization, conflict management, communication, etc basically
contribute to ensuring social equity among water appropriators of
both irrigation systems. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that
farmer-managed irrigation systems have been sustainable for a
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relatively long period of time because the water appropriators have
a perception that: they have been fairly represented in the
governance structures/decision-making processes; that they have
been asked to make equitable contribution to repair and maintain
the systems on which their livelihood depends, and that they have
enjoyed the fair distribution of irrigation benefits.
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Bigha= 0.6772 hectares
Bighatti= annual irrigation service fee per Bigha
Bhujabhandi= labor contribution with tiffin to work for the full day until
the repair and maintenance of the main canal system and headwork is
over
Chauble= four laborers to be sent per 25 Bighas of land
Chaukidar= watchman-cum-messenger in the local context




Khara= fine imposed on absentee water appropriator
Kulara= one Kulara means one laborer per 25 Bighas of land which is the
unit of water allocation between and among the Muajas of the
irrigation systems
Jharuwa= contribution of labor for the repair and maintenance of the canal
system on compulsory basis by each water appropriating household
until the work is over
Mauja= a settlement cluster which roughly corresponds to a village
Maujani NathlNap= the measurement of the main canals assigned by the
Meth Mukliyar to each Mauja for the annual repair and maintenance
which is proportionate to the size of its command area
Meth Muktiyar=-the chief system level staff
Sabik= as usual, for instance, one laborer to be sent per 25 Bighas of land
Sheer Kualhai= labor work for the repair and maintenance of the
headwork of the canal
Sidhabandhi= labor contribution with foodstuff for the night halt until the
repair and maintenance of the main canal system and headwork is
over
Treble: three laborers to be sent per 25 Bighas of land
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